Why Israel "accepted" the US Cease-Fire Proposal and Hamas "rejected" it?

This is a short but important post.

There are reports all over the place about the Israeli “acceptance” of the US bridging proposal to end the war in Gaza, and the Hamas “rejection” of it. These reports should be taken with a pinch of salt. To understand why, we should go back in time.

In 1974-75, the Gerald Ford administration was keen on an Israeli withdrawal in (not “from”) the Sinai, an area Israel seized from Egypt in 1967. This led to indirect negotiations between Israel and Egypt, which reached a climax on 4 September 1975, when the parties signed the Sinai Interim Agreement, or Sinai II, as it is better known.

Under its terms, Israel agreed to withdraw its forces to between thirty and sixty-five kilometres east of the Suez Canal and deploy them east of the Gidi and Mitla passes. To pressurise Israel to do the latter (it would be the first Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967), Washington offered it many carrots.

One of these came in the form of secret US aid commitments, described as “mind-boggling” by some American officials. Thus, for instance, the United States committed itself to make every effort to be fully responsive “on an ongoing and long-term basis” - by getting an annual Congress approval - to Israel’s military equipment and other defence requirements. This meant permanent large-scale military and financial support, a contingency plan for meeting Israel’s military needs in any emergency, and a pledge to preserve and consolidate Israel’s military support by furnishing it with the most advanced and sophisticated weaponry, such as F-15 fighters, that America could offer.

Negotiating the Sinai II Agreement

Now, at Israel’s request, Washington also undertook not to put forward, in any negotiations between Israel and its enemies, any proposals without first making “every effort to coordinate with Israel its proposal with a view to refraining from putting forth proposals that Israel would consider unsatisfactory” (here I’m quoting from the letter President Ford sent to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 1 September 1975). This, of course, was a significant pledge since it gave Israel a direct input into - indeed, power of veto over - the formulation of all US "proposals”.

Why is all of this relevant to the current Gaza War and the Blinken “bridging” proposal to a cease-fire? Simply because, despite the passage of time, Washington continues to stick to its 1974-75 pledge to show—indeed coordinate with—Israel all its proposals. That’s exactly what Blinken did - he discussed his “bridging” cease-fire proposals with Netanyahu first and accepted Israel’s reservations and demands. No wonder that Netanyahu “accepted” it. Hamas, on the other hand, when it got the opportunity to see the American “bridging” proposal, realised that it was a “bridging” proposal which reflected Israel’s interests. No wonder that it rejected it out of hand.

Blinken and Netanyahu