People expect the writer of Israel’s Wars to know whether or not Israel will invade Lebanon. I’m saying that because, in recent days, this has been a repeated question that journalists worldwide kept asking me. Well—as I tell them—“I don’t know,” and I suspect the Israelis themselves don’t know yet! Troops do cross into Lebanon, but they do so to collect information and "test the water "; that’s not their invasion.
Anyway, here are a few thoughts on the subject:
A few weeks ago, the Israeli government decided to shift the centre of gravity from its war in Gaza to Lebanon. The aim is to return tens of thousands of residents evacuated from northern border areas to their homes. The problem, however, is that the Radwan force of Hezbollah is on the other side of the border. Perhaps I should qualify it: most of the Radwan force is not there any longer due to massive Israeli bombardments, but their bunkers and infrastructure are still there, can not easily be destroyed from the air, and the Radwan combatants can return and threaten Israeli villages.
So, what the Israelis need to do is to “convince” the remaining combatants of Hezbollah to pull back from the border area and, somehow, clear this area of bunkers and so on.
The Israelis have mobilised forces to the north in preparations for a ground operation, and clearly, they let the world know that this is what they intend to do - to send in tanks and troops.
Are they bluffing? Yes and no. In an ideal world, the Israeli preference is to see the Lebanese government take advantage of the current weakness of Hezbollah and dispatch the Lebanese army to the south to take over from Hezbollah. Also, the Israelis probably want to see Hezbollah dismantled just like Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War. But the latter might take too long, and unlike in Gaza, things seem to go quite well for the Israelis in Lebanon, and there is pressure, coming mainly from the military, to take advantage of the good momentum and move into south Lebanon. If forced to the wall, I would hesitantly predict that it is more likely that the Israelis invade than not, but I could be wrong on it.
What are their options? The aim is not to occupy Lebanon; therefore, we are talking about a limited ground incursion. I can see two options.
Option one: a small incursion into Lebanon, say 5-15 km, taking over the ridge overlooking Israel, which will stop Hezbollah from firing directly into the villages; obviously, such a limited incursion will not stop rockets fired from deeper areas of Lebanon into Israel.
Option two: still a limited military operation, but one which is going up to the Litani River and setting up a similar “security zone” as Israel had in south Lebanon from 1985 to 2000; namely, Israeli control over around 10 per cent of Lebanese territory. If the Israelis go for option two, we will probably see an invasion coming from Israel proper and also, I reckon, forces coming from the sea to the mouth of the Litani, or perhaps landing deep in Lebanon and then moving south, clearing everything on their path.
Israel’s Security Zone in Lebanon 1985-2000
The risks: Fighting on the ground in Lebanon means that the Israelis lose much of their advantages, as the geography of south Lebanon makes it difficult for tanks and other heavy machinery to manoeuvre.
The long-term risk is that Israel gets bogged down in Lebanon. As a young IDF captain, I participated in “Operation Peace for Galilee”, which quickly became “The Lebanon War”. It was supposed to last between 48 and 72 hours; in reality, Israel got stuck in Lebanon for 18 years, facing effective Hezbollah guerrilla attacks, which killed more than 850 troops, and which was the main reason why Israel pulled out in 2000.
Defence Minister Yoav Gallant meeting Israeli commanders in north Israel.